Yes, Ukrainian “offensive” has succeeded because it achieved its main objective–it created informational noise, especially in the environment of “military experts”, such as you can take a look at Dima from Military Summary at Gonzalo’s Round-table three weeks ago. This is a definition of an amateur spewing sophomoric military BS with conviction. You know how I hate all those so called SitReps’ forecasts, because I clearly understand my huge limitations in knowing what respective staffs know on the ground, let alone what people in General Staff know, but allow me, this time:
Let me explain… again! Here is a definition from Russian Combat Manual (Field Manual) of Offensive. Combat Manual describes offensive, in this case, for platoon size formation :
180. В зависимости от обстановки и поставленных задач наступление может вестись на обороняющегося, наступающего или отходящего противника. В зависимости от готовности обороны противника и степени его огневого поражения наступление взвода (отделения, танка) на обороняющегося противника осуществляется с выдвижением из глубины или из положения непосредственного соприкосновения с ним.
Transaltion: 179. An offensive is carried out with the aim of defeating the opposing enemy, capturing the designated object and creating conditions for subsequent actions. It consists in defeating the enemy with all available means, a decisive attack, the rapid advance of troops into the depths of his battle formation, the destruction and capture of manpower, the capture of weapons, equipment and various objects. Defeat is understood as the infliction of such damage on the enemy, in which he loses the ability to resist. The personnel of a platoon (squad, tank), using the results of the fire engagement of the enemy, must conduct an offensive with full effort, continuously day and night, in any weather and in close cooperation with other subunits, defeat the opposing enemy. 180. Depending on the situation and the assigned tasks, an offensive may be carried out against a defending, advancing or retreating enemy. Depending on the readiness of the enemy’s defense and the degree of his fire damage, the attack of a platoon (squad, tank) on the defending enemy is carried out from the depth or from a position of direct contact with him.
You may reasonably point out that the definition of offensive by no means contradicts Kiev regime’s claims. True in form, not in substance. And here is how professionals view this whole situation:
1. Offensives differ–dramatically. By their aims (scope) and that is why we have strategic offensive operations and tactical ones, where you have formations the size of company-battalion ATTACKING.
2. Here comes this OTHER thing. What is attack. Attack, actually, is a maneuver designed for fastest closing of the distance between us and the enemy (its formations or lines of defense) and here it matters greatly.
Here is this crucial difference, judging by what this Ukie “offensive” has accomplished we can say that VSU ATTACKED–they surely tried to close the distance fast between them and Russian forces. But did they achieve ANY aims of the offensive? Recall definition of the offensive above which describes the essence. Right, I quote Combat Manual, again: It consists in defeating the enemy with all available means, a decisive attack, the rapid advance of troops into the depths of his battle formation, the destruction and capture of manpower, the capture of weapons, equipment and various objects. Do you see any of that achieved? See the news from RT, quoiting Russian MoD. Now take a look at Larry’s explanations:
Yes, VSU ATTACKED and got destroyed. Here is another American real professional.
That’s Colonel Douglas MacGregor quoting Daniel Davis. Pay attention how the terminology is used. Now, as people on the ground report (in Russian), the number of attackers of VSU is estimated to be around 12,000, which is roughly a division, but rather two brigades’ forces and here, as people from Kherson report is the essence of which I warned for months.
Translation: The number of attackers is estimated at about 12 thousand, which is critically not enough for the development of success. The Armed Forces of Ukraine do not yet have a second echelon and reserves, including equipment, in this area, and this runs counter to the statements of the Ukrainian leadership about “a million mobilized” for the “liberation of the south of the country.” In fact, the Ukrainian military achieved only one thing – they advanced 7 km in a southeasterly direction on the segment between the villages of Andreevka and Lozovo and found themselves blocked on the steppe landscape in the area of village Sukhoi Stavok. Taking advantage of the increased attention of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to this village. Kyiv tried to eliminate the Arkhangelsk bridgehead (located near the urban-type settlement of Arkhangelskoye, 45 km northeast of Sukhoi Stavok) in order to exclude the potential possibility of its use for strikes by the Uragan systems against the strongholds of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the near approaches to Krivoy Rog. This idea of the Armed Forces of Ukraine also failed. Active counter-battery and anti-tank actions by Russian units, as well as Su-25SM air strikes, not only ensured control over the bridgehead, but also made it possible to undermine the defense capability of a number of Ukrainian fortifications.
Now recall what I said–VSU CANNOT conduct successful offensive operations in the area against such forces as Russia has. As Russian military professional (who I respect, actually) Alexey Leonkov tells today (in Russian)–yep, with Russian ISR complex and firepower you just cannot conceal anything and you are going to annihilated, as is the case. But the most telling sign of a VSU’s catastrophe in the steppes near Kherson is this piece of news:
Translation: MOSCOW, August 29/ Radio Sputnik. To resolve the Ukrainian conflict, it is necessary to negotiate and seek compromises, Odessa Mayor Gennady Trukhanov said in an interview with the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera.
No shit, genius. Where have you been before and why such a flexibility all of a sudden? And here is the issue: while VSU desperate and catastrophic attack around Kherson may have been an attempt at feint for possible attack in Kharkov area (good luck with that), it is clear that Odessa and establishment of the land bridge to Transdnistria is the final objective of Russia’s operations in the South of what used to be Ukraine. In the end, Dmitry Medvedev described 1.5 scenarios in which Kiev has to unconditionally surrender under any scenario. Simple as that. But I am sure that in coming weeks all these military “analysts” such as Podolyakas, Dimas and other professional monetising shysters both in Russia and in the West will continue to tell us about what amounts to a tactical episode which is a good fodder for media circus. Here is my take on this “offensive”.