Thanks to Larch who pointed my nose to the article by Lt.Colonel John Dolan at the Task and Purpose site. The title of article leaves no secret what is it all about: The Army is getting leaders ready for a war unlike any the US has ever seen. The service is moving away from the past and training for future operations against China and Russia. There, Nolan makes some assertions which need to be elaborated upon. Nolan opens with this:
There is absolutely no doubt that Pentagon (and CIA) have been looking at Russia’s Wars very attentively. It is true for both Syrian Campaign and, of course, events in Ukraine since 2014 and, especially, now with SMO. Nolan’s article is not a very tacit admission of an utter failure of the Pentagon’s fighting doctrine and of the return, as is perceived in the US, of the massive scale combined arms warfare. Of course, in reality it never went away and Russians never abandoned this view of war, even despite the reign, primarily in the information environment, of the concepts such as Revolution in Military Affairs, Counter-insurgency and other similar concepts which were the extension of the overall American view on the warfare which none other than a fanatical Russophobe Richard Pipes (which makes it even more valuable under circumstances) noted in 1977:
This quote from Pipes’ otherwise loony and, naturally, incompetent piece Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War, should have been used by Nolan as a preamble to his piece, because it covers immediately the foundation on which US warfare was built and it answers immediately the question WHY the United States Army Couldn’t Fight and Win a Massive Scale Combined Arms War in Eastern Europe. Nolan goes to a great length trying to frame a discussion by reviewing the operational environment and manuals which the United States Army tries to adapt to the realities of the possible war, titled in Pentagonese LSCO (Large Scale Combat Operations) with Russia or China. It is all fine and dandy, and, in fact, necessary. Nolan adds here a personal touch:
Well, that is a good start and it is the duty of professionals to view things in proper perspective and framework but the reason the United States Army couldn’t win LSCO in Eastern Europe against Russia is already answered by… Pipes and it is very simple:
1. The United States as a country is incapable to face the number of casualties, especially in KIAs, which will amount, roughly, to 1,000-1,500 KIAS per day alone. This is not a theorem, it is an axiom. In other words, what Nolan admits as shortcomings are, even when one has the ability to adapt somewhat tactically and operationally, what Nolan terms as to be “employed thoughtfully”, to the realities of European LSCO, one still is reduced to this proverbial:
2.TOE: Table of Organization and Equipment. Like this relic of the Cold War 1.0.
And here is the thing which SMO demonstrated perfectly and which the US Army NEVER experienced in its history.
A) Classic truism of the 3rd Generation Wars (per Soviet Military thinkers) of stand off and SMART munitions and increasing accuracy of the targeting which is known since 1980s: If I see you, I can kill you. Obviously a bunch (in thousands) of the annihilated NATO “volunteers” in Ukraine cannot testify to this tactical and operational truism, but some, who had enough IQ to save their asses by running, will–it is true. Russia, as the US, has a superb and constantly improving ISR complex and, unlike any other potential enemy of the US, can deny the US the same, including removing or disabling most of the US space based recon assets both physically and by a “soft kill”.
B) This all comes down to this TOE, especially its “Equipment” part since Russia not only deploys megawatt class combat lasers but builds specially designed systems capable to “kill” any number of enemy satellites, including whatever Elon Musk wants to put into orbit. One of the unpleasant, for the NATO, things here is that these systems are capable not only to “remove” NATO’s space-based assets but are capable of fighting US’ counter-measures, thus ensuring a continuous operation of crucial parts of Recon and Targeting systems such as Liana, as an example. Once you lose situational awareness–you lose. The United States Army never fought under such conditions.
C) Maneuver: here comes this back to TOE, its “Equipment” part, issue: maneuver with WHAT? Putting aside a few hundred French and German Main Battle Tanks, M1 Abrams with its monstrous weight and dimensions is not a very effective platform in the environment where it will have to face hundreds of T-90M Proryv (all Netcentric and capable to even provide targeting to Russian Air Force assets) and now serially produced T-14 Armatas, while classic US battlefield strength in Close Air Support most likely will be either mitigated or removed altogether. Because, and you may have guessed it, and I wrote about it many times–the United States simply has no concept of advanced Troops Air Defense, unless one wants to impress Russians with this:
Nolan is correct in his conclusion that:
But here is the issue–in order to have this “E” in TOE you need a national military-industrial capability which was lost by the United States long time ago and I was probably one of the first, may be even first, people who by 2017 started to point out to the United States losing Arms Race to Russia. Today the improvement in capabilities for the United States Army rests not just with, however important, combat training or new curriculum and instructional approach, knowing an academic catastrophe unfolding, as an example, in the USMA in West Point. It rests with the ability of the United States to produce effective and competitive weapons for the modern war, but I don’t see this happening any time soon because the issue is systemic and it straddles the whole spectrum of political, economic and military activities in the United States today. The prognosis is not good.
But Nolan is not the only one who begins to ask some hard questions. As some at West Point asked two years ago:
What If It Doesn’t End Quickly? Reconsidering US Preparedness for Protracted Conventional War